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James: James: Automobile Liability Insurance

Recent Cases
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE-OMNIBUS
COVERAGE FOR SECOND PERMITTEES
United States Fidelity 6 Guaranty Co. v.
SAFECO Insurance Co. of America1
When Jane Kloepper first began to drive her mother's car at age sixteen, she was told not to permit anyone else to drive it. A year and a half
later, accompanied by a friend, Jane used the car to go bowling. Later in
the evening they met two boys, Chapman and Alonzo. At Jane's request
Chapman drove the car while she rode in the rear. Chapman subsequently
drove the car off the road into a tree, causing injuries to the other two
passengers. They recovered judgments against Chapman for their injuries
totaling $132,500, and Alonzo's father recovered a judgment for $18,500
against Chapman for the loss of his son's services. Prior to the accident,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. had issued an automobile liability
2
policy containing an omnibus clause to Mrs. Kloepper as named insured.
SAFECO Insurance Co. of America had issued its policy containing a nonowned automobile clause to Chapman's father. 3 The insurers brought a

declaratory judgment action to determine their liability, if any, on these
policies. The trial court held that both companies were liable and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.4
The question whether a second permittee-i.e., one who drives the
car with the permission of another who himself was given permission to
1, 522 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. Statutes commonly require that automobile liability insurance policies

contain a so-called omnibus clause providing that the term "insured" includes the
named insured as well as anyone using the automobile with his permission.
R. ANDERSON, 12 COUCH ON INSuRANcE 2D 45:291 (2d ed. 1964). Section 303.190.2,
RSMo 1969, requires that a motor vehicle liability policy "insure the person
named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle ...
with the express or implied permission of such named insured. ..

."

The purpose of

the omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy is to protect the pub.
lic, the named insured, and the persons within the omnibus clause from negligent
drivers. R. ANDERSON, 12 CoucH

ON

INsURANCE 2D 45:293 (2d ed. 1964).

The omnibus clause contained in the policy issued to Mrs. Kloepper read:
The following are Insured under Part I: (a) with respect to the owned
automobile, (1) the Named Insured and any resident of the same household. (2) any person using such automobile with the permission of the
Named Insured, providing his actual operation or (if he is not operating)
his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission....
522 S.W.2d at 811.
3. The issue of coverage by the non-owned automobile clause in Mr. Chapman's policy will not be discussed in this note.
4. In addition to holding that Chapman was covered by both policies, the
court also held that an agreement entered into by Chapman's guardian ad litern
pursuant to section 537.065, RSMo 1969, after SAFECO had persistently refused
to defend Chapman was not a collusive agreement. 522 S.W.2d at 819-20.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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use the car by the named insured-is covered by the omnibus clause in the
named insured's policy has been frequently litigated. 5 Several different
approaches have evolved in the cases. In Odolecki v. Hartford Accident
Insurance Co.6 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the second permittee is covered in all cases. Most courts have not gone so far. The predominant view is that whether the first permittee had authority to permit
another to drive is a factual question.7 The first permittee's authority to
permit another to drive can be found from the scope of the initial permission granted to the first permittee by the named insured8 as well as by the
named insured's and the first permittee's subsequent conduct. 9 Most of the
cases agree that if the named insured gives his permittee unrestricted use
of the car, the permittee is authorized to allow another to drive. 10
Missouri courts have previously been reluctant to extend omnibus
clause coverage to a second permittee. Before SAFECO only Haynes v.
Linder" had held a second permittee to be covered by the omnibus clause,
but the court there found that the named insured had expressly assented
2
to the first permittee's allowing the second perzmittee to use the car.'
SAFECO's holding that the named insured's permission for the first permittee to allow another to drive the car can be implied from the named
insured's course of conduct represents an extension of omnibus clause coverage in Missouri.
The court found that by continually allowing Jane broad and unrestricted use of the car, Mrs. Kloepper indicated her willingness for Jane
to permit others to drive the car.' 3 In determining that Mrs. Kloepper had
given Jane unrestricted use of the car, the court noted that Jane had her
own set of keys and that she used the car 75 percent of the time to go shopping, to go to parties, and to visit friends. The court also looked carefully
at the kind of arrangement which existed between Mrs. Kloepper and
Jane with respect to the latter's use of the car. Characterizing the arrangement as an exceedingly loose one,' 4 the court stated that a "parent needs to
5. See cases collected in 4 A.L.R.3d 10 (1965).-.
'6. 55 N.J. 542, 264 A.2d 38 (1970). Odolecki said that the policies of
minimizing litigation and of assuring that all persons who are wrongfully injured
have -financially responsible persons- to look, to for damages require that the
second permittee be covered by the omnibus clause. Id. at 548-49,, 264 A.2d at 41-42.
7. See, e.g., National Grange Mut. Liab. Co. v. Metroka, 250 F.2d 933

(3d Cir. 1958); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Carlyle, 428 S.W.2d 753 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968).
8. See, e.g., United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 190

F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1951); Boyer v. Massachusetts Bonding 9- Ins. Co., 277 Mass.
359, 178 N.E. 523 (1931); Haynes v. Linder, 323 SW.2d 505 (K.C. Mo. App.
1959).
9. See, e.g., Haynes v. Linder, 323 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959); Holthe
v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 197 P.2d 999 (1948).
10. See, e.g., Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App. 1939); Robinson
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 190 Va. 368, 57 S.E.2d 93 (1950).
11. 323 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
.12. Id. at 512.

.13. 522 S.W.2d at 816.
14. Id. at 814.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/12
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be more specific in restrictions about the automobile."' 5 A mother of a
teenaged daughter with a car, the court reasoned, should expect that the
daughter would allow a boy to drive when she is with him on social outings.'0 Even though Mrs. Kloepper had previously forbidden Jane to allow
anyone else to drive the car, the court apparently thought that her lack
of control over Jane's use of the car in the period between the admonition
and the accident amounted to her acquiesence in Jane's allowing others to
drive, at least in reasonably foreseeable situations such as social outings
with boys.,
The SAFEGO court could simply have followed other, decisions by
finding that Chapman could not have been driving with Mrs. Kloepper's
17
implied permission because she had expressly withheld such permission.
The court, however, took a practical approach and acknowledged that
parents who give their, teenaged child the use of their car are aware that
without strict controls ;the child will allow friends to drive in certain
social situations.18 Chapman reasonably believed that he was driving with
proper permission, and Mrs. Kloepper was responsible for his belief because of the manner in which she permitted Jane to use the car. It would
have been unfair to have denied him coverage because of a secret verbal
restriction about which he could not reasonably be expected to know.10 It
seems equally unfair that a secret restriction should deprive the victims of
the accident of; ar insurance fund from which to recover for their injuries.
SAFECO, however, appears to be only a limited extension of omnibus
clause coverage for second permittees. The court expressly rejected the
20
policy argument that second permittees should be covered in all cases.
It also declined to overrule previous Missouri cases holding that the first
permittee wasnot authorized to permit another to drive. 21 The court dis15. Iii.
16. Id. at 813.

17. See, e.g-, Hopson v. Shelby Mut. Gas. Co., 203 F.2d 434 (4th Cir.. 1953);
Norris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 39 Cal. 2d 420, 247 P.2d 1 (1952); Cocos v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 302 Ill. App. 442, 24 N.E.2d 75 (1939); Carlton v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1957).
18. 522 S.W.2d at 813.
19. The Kansas Supreme Court supports this view:
The insurance protection of the public, as well as of all persons operating
motor vehicles, . .. requires that the matter of coverage not be determined
after an accident and controlled by a named insured's verbal admonitions
given before the accident. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ace. 9, Indem. Co., 210 Kan. 769, 774, 504 P.2d
161, 165 (1972).
20. Odoledci v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 55 N.J. 542, 264 A.2d 38 (1970)
is the lbading case in support of the policy argument. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
21. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 492 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973); Government Employees Ins. Co. v,Lammert, 483 S.W.2d 652 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. &:Indem. Co., 486
S.W.2d 38 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1972); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Carlyle, 428 S.W.2d 753
(Spr. Mo. App. 1968); Helinkamp v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d
559 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Nye v. James, 373 S.W.2d 655 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963);
(Spr. Mo.
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tinguished the earlier decisions on their facts and emphasized that whether
a second permittee is covered will continue to be decided on a case by case
basis. 22 Moreover, SAFECO apparently does not extend coverage to a sec-

ond permittee using the car for his own purposes. The court recognized the
distinction between a second permittee driving the car for the first permittee's purposes and his using it for his own. 23 Chapman was driving the
car for Jane's social purposes and not for any purpose of his own. The
court discussed the scope of Jane's authority in terms of permitting another
to drive. 24 In this context, the court's use of the term "drive" in its holding,25 rather than the broader term "use," makes it clear that the decision
was meant to apply only where the second permittee is driving the car for
26
the first permittee's purposes.
This limitation on omnibus clause coverage, however, is unduly nar-

row. If a second permittee using the car for his own purposes is not covered
by the omnibus clause, one cannot safely borrow a friend's car without
first investigating the extent of the friend's authority with respect to the
car. Less diligence may result in such a borrower being an uninsured driver,
even though he reasonably believed the friend owned the car.27 This result
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 336 S.V.2d 123 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Varble v. Stanley,
306 S.W.2d 662 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957).
22. Quoting from Teague v. Tate, 213 Tenn. 269, 375 S.W.2d 840 (1964), the

SAFECO court stated:
[W]e do not "intend to lay down the rule that will license the first permittee to select a second permittee who will, in all cases, become an addi-

tional insured. Each case should be considered on the facts presented."
522 S.W.2d at 816.
23. The court said:
Jane Kloepper was using the automobile (she was riding in it, which is
a use of the automobile) and while she was not operating it, her actual
use of the automobile . . . was well within the scope of the broad permission she had from her mother....
522 S.W.2d at 813.
24. The court stated:
... Mrs. Kloepper gave implied permission to Jane Kloepper to permit
others to operate the vehicle when Jane was in the car and it was being
used for purposes which Jane was authorized to make of it.
Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
25. "Permission . . . can be found ... to permit the first permittee to au
thorize others to drive.. . ." Id. (emphasis added).
26. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. &cIndem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1972), discussed "use" and "drive" as those terms are employed by the
omnibus clause:
[Als employed in an omnibus clause "use" is a term of much broader
scope and application than "operate" or "drive," and ... the latter terms
are of narrower and more restricted meaning. Although one who operates
an automobile obviously uses it, one can use an automobile without
operating it.,
Id. at 43. In SAFECO Jane was still using the car, even though she had delegated
the operation of it to Chapman. See note 23 supra.
27. An earlier appellate decision, however, refused to uphold the trial court's
reasoning that the father of a teenaged boy who has free use of the car knows that
the boy may on occasion permit a friend to use the car for an errand. The appellate court stated:
Under the reasoning of the trial court if a father permitted his son to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/12
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is not consonant with general social expectations. People do not interrogate
their friends as to their authority to lend the car before borrowing it. If
the friend treats the car as his own, they assume that he either owns it or
has authority to allow others to use it.
The SAFECO court took a realistic approach in determining that
Jane was authorized to allow another to drive the car for her purposes. The
court considered all of the surrounding circumstances and took into account what a mother should expect of her teenaged daughter in certain
social situations."8 By doing so, the court avoided a harsh result. The decision, however, is apparently limited to narrow factual situations like that
presented in SAFECO. Missouri courts should take a more expansive approach and extend coverage to a second permittee using the car for his
own purposes, at least where the named insured has given the first permittee broad and unrestricted use of the car.29 If the first permittee's

authorized use of the car is so unrestricted that the second permittee
reasonably believes either that the first permittee owns the car or has
authority to treat the car as his own, the second permittee ought to be
covered by the omnibus clause in the named insured's policy. It is not
reasonable to expect that members of the public will investigate a first
permittee's actual authority to lend the car when from all appearances he
has that authority. When the named insured has allowed these appearances
to exist, it is fair that his insurance should provide the protection for the
driver and the public.
CHARLES F.

JAMES

drive the car he would necessarily have knowledge that he would permit
his friend to also drive it. We cannot agree with this reasoning.
M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 361 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
28. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
29. Other jurisdictions have taken this view. See, e.g., Tisdale v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.E.2d 390, rev'd sub nor. on other grounds, Holcomb v. Miller,
269 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. App. 1971) (broad permission implied from the circumstances included authority for the first permittee to delegate permission for another to use the car for the other's own purposes); Cascade v. Glacier Gen. Ins.
Co., 156 Mont. 236, 479 P.2d 259 (1971). The Cascade court said "[Tjhis insured
clothed the first permittee with the ostensible authority . . . [to permit] a friend
Published
of Missouri
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